Financial accounting researchers using archival methods tend to rely on theories from finance and economics to guide their investigations, while experimental researchers largely use psychology theories. Because researchers in finance and economics have begun to question whether markets are always efficient (Daniel et al. 2002) , they have increasingly relied on psychology theories to develop hypotheses and interpret results (e.g., Mikhail et al. 1997; Bonner et al. 2001; Hillary and Menzly 2002) . This paper explores the role of psychology theories in archival financial accounting research. Specifically, we examine three topical areas of financial accounting research -voluntary disclosure, earnings management, and financial analyst performance. For each area, we provide examples of existing archival papers that successfully employ psychology-based theories and outline how such theories can provide further insights for future research.
INTRODUCTION
Financial accounting studies using archival data traditionally have relied on theories from finance and economics. However, archival studies have begun to employ psychology theories to develop hypotheses and interpret results (e.g., Mikhail et al. 1997; Bonner et al. 2001; Hillary and Menzly 2002) .
1 This paper further explores the role of psychology-based theories in archival financial accounting research and explains how such theories can provide profitable insights into issues facing financial accounting researchers.
Psychologists have developed a number of robust theories describing human behavior.
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Because financial accounting issues involve human judgments and decisions (e.g, those made
by investors, analysts, managers, and auditors), psychology research should provide insights to our understanding of these issues. Other papers have detailed the role of psychology theories for experimental financial accounting research (Libby et al. 2001 ) and finance and economics theories for archival financial accounting research (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Lev 1989) . In this paper, we focus on how psychology theories can be used in conjunction with archival methods to study financial accounting problems. Specifically, we consider three topical areas of research in financial accounting -voluntary disclosure, earnings management, and financial analyst performance -and examine how psychology theories help us understand important issues in each area. We chose these three areas because each contains examples of existing papers that successfully draw on research from psychology and has significant opportunity for using psychology theories to guide additional research. We do not provide an exhaustive review of the archival accounting literature, nor do we provide critiques of particular studies. Instead, we focus on examples of successful use of psychology theories in archival studies and describe how a psychology-based approach can provide additional insights.
Research in psychology has advanced our understanding in a number of business-related areas. For example, behavioral finance emerged as an important area when finance researchers called upon the psychology literature to explain various market anomalies (see Daniel et al. 2002 for a review). We believe that psychology theories can make significant contributions to the archival financial accounting literature as well.
Two aspects of psychology theories make them especially useful for advancing our understanding of accounting behaviors. First, psychology theories help describe the processes that underlie the achievement of economic equilibriums. For example, whereas economic theories can describe the equilibrium prices that result if managers have different levels of reporting credibility, they provide little insight into how managers develop credibility over time. Similarly, economic theories predict the equilibrium forecasts that result if analysts differ in their levels of expertise, but not how analysts develop expertise. Psychology can help fill these gaps by providing theoretical guidance on the development of credibility (e.g., Jones and Davis 1965) and expertise (e.g., Hunter 1983; Schmidt et al. 1986 ).
Second, because psychology theories tend to be descriptive rather than normative, they do not presume that behaviors are the product of rational forces. Relaxing the rationality assumption allows psychologists to explain the observed, systematic deviations from rational outcomes that economic theories ignore. For example, standard economic theories have difficulty explaining why a company would create 'cookie jar' reserves to spread gains over future accounting periods. However, such economically unjustifiable behavior follows naturally from the more psychological "prospect theory," which describes how investors value the outcomes reported by managers (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 ).
We are not advocating that psychology theories replace finance and economics theories in financial accounting research. Rather, we advocate an approach where finance, economics, and psychology theories are treated as complementary, and the most suitable theory or theories is used. In some cases, this may result in the use of theories from finance, economics, and psychology; other cases may warrant reliance on only one theory. A benefit of jointly relying on economics/finance and psychology theories is that this approach can foster the development of new theories drawn from divergent research areas. As an example, prospect theory was developed when two psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, noticed that the traditional axioms of expected utility theory were systematically violated in certain situations (Tetlock and Mellers 2002) . Consequently, these two psychologists drew on experimental results from various judgment and decision tasks and offered prospect theory as a descriptive alternative to expected utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . In developing prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky anchored on expected utility theory and then adjusted it to incorporate psychology-based principles that seemed to lie behind the anomalies. Hybrid theories such as prospect theory often extract the best of multiple theories to advance our understanding of human behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the current state of the accounting literature and possible reasons for the limited reliance on psychology theories in archival accounting research. We then discuss how theories from psychology may provide insights to archival researchers in the areas of voluntary disclosure, earnings management, and financial analyst performance. The final section concludes.
STATE OF THE LITERATURE
Financial accounting researchers using archival methods traditionally have relied on theories from finance and economics to guide their investigations. This emphasis on finance and economics is natural, as much of the academic training for accounting researchers is in these fields. The association has been productive; economic and finance theories have advanced our understanding of, for example, how accounting information affects market prices (Beaver 1989 ) and how managerial incentives affect accounting choices (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) .
Accounting studies that use experimental methods typically draw on theories from either economics or psychology (Libby et al. 2001) . Studies in experimental economics often test theoretical models from economics or rely heavily on economic theories. For example, a study might examine how the release of accounting information affects trading behavior and market prices in a controlled laboratory setting (Bloomfield and Libby 1996) . Other experimental studies, drawing mainly on theories from psychology, have examined topics such as individual investors' reactions to financial disclosures or analyst reports in nonmarket settings (Hirst et al. 1995; Libby and Tan 1999) .
What is missing from the accounting literature is an abundance of research that draws on psychology theories but uses archival methods. There are several reasons why such studies are relatively rare. First, the curriculum in most doctoral programs has separate, and relatively non-overlapping, tracks in either finance and economics or psychology. Students concentrating in archival methods typically are well trained in finance and economics but have less training in psychology theories, while students interested in experimental methods concentrate mainly on psychology coursework.
Second, the philosophy of those trained in finance and economics often is at odds with that of those trained in psychology. Researchers in both psychology and economics/finance seek to understand and describe human behavior. However, as one well-known psychologist put it, psychology and economics seem to be "two disciplines divided by a common interest" (D. Gilbert, personal communication, July 20, 2000) . Psychology research tends to be descriptive in nature and studies human behavior at the level of the individual decision-maker.
Psychologists are less concerned with deviations from an optimal model, and rationality usually is not assumed. 3 Finance and economics researchers, in contrast, typically assume rationality. To the extent that rationality is not assumed, errors are assumed to be random and thus to cancel in the aggregate (Camerer 1987; Schleifer 2000) . Because individual biases are assumed to be eliminated by market forces, behaviors often are studied at an aggregate level.
Fundamental differences in the assumptions underlying research in psychology and economics/finance have impeded full appreciation of each other's theories.
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Impediments caused by this second obstacle have been fading. Some researchers now question whether markets are always efficient (Daniel et al. 2002) . As a result, archival financial accounting researchers are beginning to incorporate psychology theories when generating hypotheses and interpreting results. In the following section, we explore three areas where psychology theories may prove especially helpful -voluntary disclosure, earnings management, and financial analyst performance.
APPLYING PSYCHOLOGY THEORIES TO FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING QUESTIONS

Voluntary Disclosure and Attribution Theory
Firm managers respond to the potential underpricing of their firm's stock in various ways, including voluntarily disclosing information to analysts and other market participants (Healy and Palepu 1993 (Miller and Ross 1975; Folkes and Kotsos 1986) . That is, people provide dispositional attributions for positive outcomes (e.g., sales in my division are up because of my superior management skills) and situational attributions for negative outcomes (e.g., sales in my division are down because consumers are spending less on luxury goods).
Several archival studies rely on attribution theory to develop hypotheses about why managers make certain voluntary disclosures. Bettman and Weitz (1983) and Staw et al. (1983) examine shareholder letters in annual reports and find that managers are more likely to take credit for the company's past successes than for its failures. Baginski and Hassell (2000) show that self-serving biases also affect managers' explanations for their firm's expected future performance. They find that when an earnings forecast entails good news, companies are likely to attribute the news to internal or dispositional causes (e.g., great leadership, good products). In contrast, when an earnings forecast is negative, companies are likely to attribute the negative news to external or situational factors (e.g., poor economy, non-recurring supplier problem, bad luck).
Given the disclosure tendencies that follow from the basic tenets of attribution theory, the next logical question is: Do investors see through the self-serving attributions provided by managers? A key finding in the attribution literature is that the interpretation of a behavior such as a voluntary disclosure is not only a function of the content of the disclosure, but also of the recipient's perception as to why the disclosure was made (Eagly et al. 1978) . Thus, investors will discount self-serving statements if they are recognized as such. Although they do not rely on attribution theory to motivate their tests, Koch (1999) and Hutton et al. (2000) provide evidence consistent with this idea. Koch (1999) argues that firms in financial distress are more likely to provide self-serving disclosures. He predicts and finds that investors recognize self-serving disclosures and consequently, as a firm's level of financial distress increases, investors are less willing to rely on its voluntary disclosures. Hutton et al. (2000) show that investors require more supporting detail for good news management forecasts than for bad news management forecasts, presumably because investors realize that management has self-serving incentives to report good news.
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The attribution literature has the potential to provide a number of additional insights for researchers interested in voluntary disclosure issues. For example, attribution theory's covariation principle (Kelley 1967) suggests that three features of a voluntary disclosure, its distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus, will affect people's attributions about why the disclosure was made. Thus, investors will evaluate a voluntary disclosure in part based on how other companies disclose similar events (i.e., disclosure distinctiveness), how this company disclosed at other times and in other venues (i.e., disclosure consistency), and how the company disclosed to other types of financial statement users (i.e., disclosure consensus).
The covariation principle helps predict how investors and analysts react to changes in a firm's voluntary disclosures. For example, General Electric management included a number of additional disclosures in its 2001 annual report in the wake of the Enron accounting scandal. General Electric stated that these additions were part of an effort to increase disclosure transparency (Silverman 2002 Investors' attributions about the reasons for expanded disclosure have significant consequences. Only sustained increases in disclosure result in upward valuations of firms' stock prices and increased analyst and institutional interest in the firm's stock ).
In addition to describing how investors react to changes in a firm's voluntary disclosures, attribution theory provides guidance on how voluntary disclosures affect management's reputation with investors. 8 For example, the 'fundamental attribution error' predicts that individuals underestimate the extent to which a behavior is caused by the situational factors and overestimate the extent to which it is shaped the person's underlying dispositions (Ross 1977) . Consequently, when management provides inaccurate forecasts, investors may underestimate the effects of situational forces such as unexpected economic conditions and, thus, be too quick to blame management for inaccuracies. Such unwarranted attributions may lead to misperceptions about management's credibility and under-reliance on subsequent management disclosures.
The attribution literature also predicts which voluntary disclosures will have the greatest effects on management's reputation. Research by Jones and Davis (1965) shows that people are particularly likely to make dispositional attributions when they receive messages that are inconsistent with the sender's incentives. This finding implies that investors are more likely to make inferences about management based on its voluntary disclosures when the disclosures are not in management's best interest. Managers generally have greater incentives to disclose positive news than negative news. Therefore, management's disclosure policies regarding negative news will tend to have greater effects on management's reputation than its disclosure policies regarding positive news. However, managers occasionally have greater incentives to disclose negative news, such as when they are trying to lower the strike price of their stock options (Aboody and Kasznik 2000) . Attribution theory predicts that, in these situations, positive news disclosures will have greater effects on management reputation.
To summarize, archival studies have used attribution theory to predict that managers will provide self-serving explanations for their firm's financial performance. These studies show that managers tend to attribute positive results to dispositional factors such as their own expertise and negative results to environmental factors such as a poor economy (e.g., Baginski
and Hassell 2000). Attribution theory further predicts that investors will discount self-serving disclosures if they are recognized as such. Thus, attribution theory may provide a theoretical rationale for the findings of recent archival studies which find that investors have muted reactions to positive news voluntary disclosures (Hutton et al. 2000) , especially when the disclosures are issued by financially distressed firms (Koch 1999) . Finally, the attribution literature makes a number of predictions regarding how investors will react to changes in a firm's disclosure policy and how voluntary disclosures affect management's reputation with investors.
Earnings Management and Prospect Theory
A substantial amount of research has focused on whether, when, and how companies manage earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999) . However, few of these studies employ psychology theories to make predictions or explain results. Prospect theory, an extension of expected utility theory that describes how people evaluate outcomes, is a rich psychology theory whose value for understanding earnings management is relatively unrecognized (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) .
Several aspects of prospect theory should prove especially useful in explaining earnings management. First, as shown in the prospect theory value function provided in Figure 1 , people value gains and losses differently. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 279) note that, "The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount." Specifically, the amount of displeasure caused by a loss is roughly twice the amount of pleasure caused by an equal-sized gain (Tversky and Kahneman 1991) . This principle is commonly referred to as 'loss aversion.'
Second, the value function is concave for gains and convex for losses, suggesting that people exhibit diminishing marginal sensitivity to both gains and losses. For example, people will derive more pleasure from a $20 wage increase when wages increase from $20 to $40 than when wages increase from $1020 to $1040. Third, people evaluate outcomes in terms of changes relative to some natural reference point rather than evaluating outcomes based on total wealth or final asset states. The reference point is often the person's current asset position, but also can be affected by expectations, norms and social comparisons (Van de Stadt et al. 1985) . For example, when evaluating investment performance in a bear market, investors may experience small losses as gain outcomes due to the large losses that could have been incurred.
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[Insert Figure 1] The shape of the value function implies that investors will prefer that small losses be integrated with larger gains (Thaler 1999) . Consequently, if managers understand investors' value functions and manage earnings accordingly, a firm that expects to earn losses in some years and gains in other years will try to smooth earnings to avoid reporting small losses.
Consider the following example of two otherwise identical firms with different earnings patterns. Firm A determines that it is likely to earn 2 cents per share in year one and projects earnings of 9 cents per share in year two. Firm B also believes that the sum of year one and year two earnings will be 11 cents per share. However, Firm B estimates that it will experience a loss of 2 cents per share in year one and a gain of 13 cents per share in year two.
If Firm B's managers are sensitive to the shape of its investors' value functions, Firm B will try to "borrow" some of year two's earnings in order to report positive earnings in both years.
This prediction follows from the shape of prospect theory's value function. Due to the steepness of the value function in the loss domain, small reported losses create high disutility.
In addition, the diminishing marginal utility for incremental reported gains suggests that there is little benefit to reporting a large gain rather than a medium gain in year two. Thus, eliminating the disutility caused by reporting a 2-cent loss is worth more than the positive utility that results from reporting an additional 2-cent gain in year two. If Firm B does not manage earnings, then all else equal, investors should prefer to invest in Firm A, as the value experienced from Firm A's earnings stream will be greater.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) rely on prospect theory and provide archival evidence consistent with managers integrating small losses with larger gains (also see Degeorge et al. 1999) . They conjecture that investors use prior year earnings and analysts' earnings forecasts as reference points for evaluating actual reported earnings, and that managers avoid reporting small losses relative to these reference points. Consistent with these predictions, they find unusually low frequencies of small earnings losses and decreases in earnings and unusually high frequencies of small earnings gains and increases in earnings.
In addition to explaining why managers avoid reporting small losses, prospect theory may explain why firms take 'big baths' once the prospect of reporting a gain is untenable. The convex shape of the value function in the loss domain suggests that losses should be integrated into the same period to maximize the value experienced by investors. That is, if a firm must report a loss, the incremental disutility from additional losses is minimal.
Therefore, if a firm must report a loss in a given period, prospect theory would predict that the company would manage accruals to include expected future losses in this period as well.
Prospect theory also predicts that managers would try to manage accruals to shift any gains from the current period into future periods when a large loss is reported in the current period.
Shifting gains to a future period will maximize the value experienced by investors because the value from slightly reducing a large loss in the current period generally is outweighed by the value from reporting a small gain in a future period (Thaler 1999) . In sum, firms that are unable to report positive earnings should 'take a bath' by including all possible losses and excluding all possible gains from current year earnings.
Prospect theory also provides guidance to firms that experience especially profitable times.
As Thaler (1985, 202) advises, "Don't wrap all the Christmas presents in one box." The logic behind this advice suggests that firms may want to create 'cookie jar' reserves in highly profitable years. The concave shape of the value function for gains implies that investors will prefer that gains be broken out and reported in separate periods rather than reported all at once in a single period (Thaler 1999) . Consequently, if a firm's earnings significantly exceed expectations in a particular year, it should manage earnings to reserve part of the gain for a subsequent year.
Finally, prospect theory suggests that managers will try to influence the benchmarks that investors use to evaluate reported results. Because investors evaluate outcomes relative to reference points, managers typically will try to present results that exceed those reference points. As previously discussed, one method of accomplishing this is to manage earnings to exceed investors' natural reference points. 10 An alternative method of presenting results that exceed investors' reference points is to manipulate the reference points themselves. For example, managers may try to guide analysts' forecasts downward (Matsumoto 2002) or exclude nonrecurring gains (and include nonrecurring losses) from prior periods when providing prior-period earnings as a benchmark (Schrand and Walther 2000) .
To summarize, prospect theory provides guidance on how investors react to different reported outcomes. If managers anticipate investors' reactions and manage earnings accordingly, prospect theory may explain why managers attempt to manipulate both earnings and investors' expectations about those earnings. Specifically, the shape of the prospect theory value function helps explain why firms manage earnings to avoid reporting small losses, take 'big baths', and create 'cookie jar' reserves, and the importance of reference points in the evaluation of outcomes helps explain why managers try to manipulate the benchmarks used by investors.
Financial Analyst Performance and Expertise Theories
Analysts are important information intermediaries in financial markets. They analyze the financial data provided by firms and provide earnings forecasts and stock recommendations based on their analyses. The financial press suggests that some analysts perform better than others in these tasks (e.g., Institutional Investor provides a list of "All American" analysts and
The Wall Street Journal provides a list of "All Star" analysts), and the academic literature confirms that analysts differ in expertise (Stickel 1992; Sinha et al. 1997) . Several recent papers have tried to identify why some analysts perform better than others (Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999) . These papers provide somewhat conflicting results on the role that analyst characteristics such as experience play in performance. Psychologybased theories on the determinants of expertise may provide a framework for interpreting these mixed results. Clement (1999) relies on similar theoretical arguments and also finds that more experienced analysts have smaller forecast errors. However, Jacob et al. (1999) suggest that the association between experience and forecast accuracy results from survival bias. That is, more experienced analysts perform better because weaker performing analysts are forced out of the profession rather than because they learn from experience. In support of this claim, Jacob et al. find that when they include a dummy variable for each individual analyst in their regression, the effect of experience on analyst forecast errors becomes insignificant. They conclude that analyst performance is a function of "aptitude" rather than experience. Isolating the relative roles of experience and natural ability/aptitude on financial analyst performance is important because it has implications for whether training can significantly improve analysts' skills.
Interestingly, today's mixed results regarding how experience affects analyst performance mimic the audit literature from a decade ago. A number of auditing studies investigated the effects of experience on auditor performance, with some studies finding that experience improved performance and others finding that it did not (see Wright 1988 for a review). Libby and Luft (1993) ultimately provided a model of the factors influencing task performance that explained many of the conflicting results in the audit literature and may prove useful for understanding the determinants of analyst expertise as well. The Libby and
Luft model, shown in Figure 2 , is based on expertise theories from psychology (Hunter 1983; Schmidt et al. 1986 ). In the model, experience does not directly affect performance. Rather, experience provides an opportunity for knowledge acquisition, and greater knowledge improves performance. 11 The model also identifies the role of innate ability in task performance. Ability has a direct effect on performance, and also indirectly affects performance because greater ability allows for more knowledge acquisition.
[Insert Figure 2] As previously noted, Jacob et al. (1999) show that when individual dummy variables for each analyst are included in their regressions, the association between experience and performance disappears. They conclude that experience does not affect financial analyst performance. However, if the individual analyst dummy variables are capturing differing levels of knowledge between analysts, it is possible that experience still may be important in explaining analyst performance (via its effects on analyst knowledge). Libby and Luft (1993) suggest that more complex models may be necessary when testing how analyst characteristics such as experience and ability affect performance.
Expertise studies also suggest that the importance of an analyst's knowledge and abilities in predicting his or her performance will vary depending on the task being performed. For example, knowledge and ability become increasingly important determinants of performance as task complexity increases (Feltovich et al. 1984; Bonner 1994; Libby and Tan 1994) .
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Financial accounting researchers have focused on analyst performance in complex tasks such as earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. 13 However, the complexity of these tasks will vary across firms and over time. Some firms report less variable financial results and/or provide more guidance to analysts, which reduces the complexity of predicting the firm's future results. Complexity also will vary over time because financial results are more variable during certain time periods. Expertise theories suggest that knowledge and ability will improve analyst performance more in cases where financial results are difficult to predict.
14 In sum, expert analysts (i.e., those with greater ability and knowledge) will perform better than non-expert analysts, and these differences in performance will be greater for more difficult tasks (Feltovich et al. 1997) .
Psychology theories also suggest that analysts' motivations will affect analyst performance.
Much of the existing research on analyst expertise assumes that analysts have accuracy as their goal. However, analysts have incentives to please company managers and these incentives may influence earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Francis and Philbrick 1993; McNichols and O'Brien 1997) . Motivated reasoning theories from psychology may help explain how such incentives affect analysts' judgments. For example, Kunda (1987) finds that when people are motivated to reach a particular conclusion, they will seek information consistent with that conclusion (cf. Klayman and Ha 1987) . Despite a divorce rate around 50%, few people believe that their own marriage will fail. Kunda (1987) argues that this misperception occurs because people are motivated to believe that positive things will happen to them. People underestimate the likelihood of getting divorced because they focus more heavily on factors suggesting a long-lived marriage (e.g., my parent's 40-year marriage) and discount factors suggesting a divorce (e.g., my spouse has been unfaithful in the past).
Kunda's results suggest that analysts who have a preferred conclusion (e.g., a 'Strong Buy' stock recommendation) will tend to seek information supporting this conclusion. In other words, analysts may 'work backwards' by looking for supporting analysis to justify a desired forecast or recommendation rather than performing their analysis first and using the results to derive a forecast or recommendation. 15 This type of reasoning was often alleged in the popular press during the bull market of the late 1990s. Analysts were accused of starting with existing stock prices, and then providing supporting analysis (often with extreme expectations for growth) that could support such valuations (Serwer 1998) . Thus, while the accounting literature assumes that analysts 'work forwards' in providing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Bradshaw 2002) , anecdotal evidence and motivated reasoning theories suggest that analysts will sometimes 'work backwards.' Working backwards should be especially prevalent when analysts have strong motivations to provide particular forecasts or recommendations, such as when they have an investment banking relationship with the firm. high 'cash burn' rate) as positive factors to justify high valuations for Internet stocks (Nocera and Maroney 1999; Veverka 1999) .
In sum, expertise theories from psychology and auditing describe how analyst characteristics such as experience and ability influence analyst performance. These theories suggest that the relations between these variables are more complex than assumed in much of the financial accounting literature. The psychology literature also provides a basis for several unique predictions regarding how forecast complexity and analyst incentives affect analyst performance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we demonstrate how three theories from psychology, attribution theory, prospect theory, and expertise theory, can further our understanding of financial accounting issues. Attribution theory makes specific predictions about the types of voluntary disclosures that managers will provide and investors' reactions to those disclosures. The value function from prospect theory describes how investors value outcomes reported by a firm and therefore provides insights into how firms manage earnings to maximize the value experienced by investors. Expertise theories describe how factors such as experience, ability, and incentives influence task performance and thus help identify the determinants of financial analysts' expertise. We focus on these three areas because each contains existing archival research that relies on psychology theories and also has substantial opportunity for future research.
However, the psychology literature is vast, and other psychology theories may be useful as well. For example, research on social conformity (Asch 1951 ) may help explain herding in analysts' earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, and research on the use of base rate information (Koehler 1996) may prove useful for understanding over-and under-reactions to financial statement information.
One frequently-cited limitation to the usefulness of psychology theories for financial accounting research is that they are derived from the study of individual, rather than collective, behavior. Indeed, some have proposed that individual judgment biases documented in laboratory settings will cease to be relevant under the pressure of market forces.
However, a comprehensive review of existing research studies reports that incentives rarely change behaviors (Camerer and Hogarth 1999) . Thus, while incentives often tighten the distribution of individual responses (i.e., decrease the variance), they rarely change the mean.
Thus, psychology theories should be useful for predicting behaviors even in market settings.
Our enthusiasm for the role of psychology theories in archival financial research is driven a desire for more descriptive models of how financial reporting influences the behavior of managers, analysts, and investors. Psychology theories are developed inductively and have been validated in both general and applied domains. Thus, the psychology literature contains many robust findings regarding how people behave. Regardless of a researcher's method, to the extent that psychology theories can inform his or her research, they should be used.
ENDNOTES
1 When we use the term 'archival studies,' we are referring to research that tests hypotheses using historical data such as stock prices, management disclosures, and analyst forecasts. 2 There are many different areas of psychology (e.g., clinical, cognitive, developmental, social), some of which are more relevant to accounting research than others. This paper focuses on cognitive and social psychology; these areas describe how people reason, both individually and in social (i.e., multi-person) settings. 3 Some early research in psychology examined how individuals' judgments deviate from those estimated by optimal models (see Dawes et al. 1989 for a review). For example, Dawes (1971) examined whether admission officers' rankings or a linear model including GRE scores, undergraduate grade point averages, and the selectivity of the students' undergraduate institutions better explained graduate student performance. 4 A subset of researchers in psychology and economics recognized that their different worldviews were impeding progress on important issues and, in 1986, they founded the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (www.sjdm.org) to foster communication and research between the disciplines. 5 For example, managers can choose the period over which they disclose information (e.g., annual earnings forecasts, quarterly earnings forecasts) (Pownall et al. 1993) , the frequency of their disclosures (Kile et al. 1998) and the disclosures' venues (e.g., conference calls, shareholder meetings, press releases) (Bamber and Cheon 1998) . 6 The term 'attribution theory' actually refers to a set of theories that describe how people figure out why some event has occurred. The areas of attribution theory most applicable to voluntary disclosure issues are those that investigate how individuals understand the behavior of themselves and others (Heider 1958) . 7 It may seem difficult to reconcile why managers disclose in a self-serving way if investors are unwilling to accept such disclosures. The attribution literature predicts that managers may persist in providing self-serving disclosures despite investors' reluctance to accept these disclosures due to the 'false consensus effect.' The false consensus effect is the tendency to see our own behaviors as typical and to assume that others act the same way (Lord et al. 1984) . This tendency may cause managers to be unable to see that their disclosures are self-serving and thus to be unable to anticipate that investors will not accept the disclosures. 8 Investors' beliefs about management are consequential. A positive reputation is associated with less dispersion in analyst forecasts, fewer analyst forecast errors, and a lower cost-of-capital (Botosan 1997; Barron et al. 1999; . 9 Prospect theory is a powerful descriptive alternative to expected utility (and its variants such as subjective expected utility theory). Expected utility models assume that the value of an alternative is the utility of the corresponding outcomes weighted by their probabilities of occurring. Prospect theory employs a similar algebraic framework, but it replaces the notion of "utility" with "value," and replaces probability with "decision weights." In expected utility, utility is usually defined in terms of net wealth. In prospect theory, value is defined in terms of gains and losses from malleable reference points. Furthermore, the prospect theory value function has a different shape for gains and losses. For gains, it is concave and has an appearance that is similar to that provided by the expected utility models. But for losses, the value function is convex and relatively steep near the reference point. Prospect theory's tenets, which have been validated by numerous empirical tests, have important implications for understanding earnings management. 10 Investors use several natural reference points to evaluate reported earnings -zero, prior year earnings, and analysts' forecasts -and firms manage earnings to exceed these thresholds (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999) . 11 Psychologists tend to differentiate between two types of knowledge: declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge is factual knowledge, such as knowing the equation for a dividend discount model. Procedural knowledge is knowledge about how to perform a task, such as knowing how to implement the dividend discount model to value a firm. Studies in psychology show that both types of knowledge improve performance (Anderson 1990 ). 12 There is a limit on this relation. For extremely complex tasks, ability and skill are irrelevant because neither experts nor non-experts are able to perform well (Bonner 1994) . 13 These tasks are complex due to the large number of decision inputs and the lack of specified procedures for how the inputs should be combined to arrive at a final judgment (Bonner 1994 ).
14 Some psychologists might make an opposite prediction. Frensch and Sternberg (1989) predict that more experienced analysts sometimes will perform worse than less experienced analysts. They argue that experts have well-developed problem-solving strategies that usually result in superior performance but can be detrimental in new tasks or situations because their experiences cause them to be less flexible in their methodologies and ways of thinking. This lack of flexibility may cause experts to perform worse than non-experts in situations that deviate significantly from normal -such as unusual (complex) forecasting environments. 15 'Working backwards' usually will result in poor analyst performance relative to 'working forwards' (Simon and Simon 1978) . 
